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Abstract 
From the moment South Africa became a liberal democracy, the Government promised to 
deliver on social security for the poor. However, South African NGOs have reported that 
several barriers prevent poor South Africans, and black women in particular, from accessing 
the country’s social assistance system. Government inaction has compelled NGOs to 
approach the Courts. As reflected in a series of court judgements, many problems faced by 
the system relate to the administration of payments by South African and multinational 
corporations. But is this the complete story? 
 
Applying a critical, analytical lens of legal mobilisation to explain the potential of legal 
mobilisation to secure progressive structural change, this article will assess the extent to 
which civic-based, legal advocacy aimed at securing access to social grants, and challenging 
the manner in which these grants have been administered, has the potential to more 
strategically advance socioeconomic justice and inequality for South Africa’s poor.  
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1. Introduction 
 
South Africa became a liberal democracy in 1994, with a government that promised to 
deliver on ensuring social security for the poor (Goldblatt 2014: 24). Between 1994 and 
2016, social security in the form of cash transfers increased, particularly for the bottom 40 
percent of South Africa’s income distribution, leading the World Bank to observe that ‘the 
grant system [has] helped reduce poverty, stabilise the annual growth of real earnings, and 
increase employment and labour force participation among women’ (Bruni 2016: 119). The 
World Bank further remarked that ‘a combination of commitment, leadership, backing from 
the Constitution, focus on technical soundness, broad countrywide dialogue, and engagement 
with civil society contributed to this success’ (Ibid: 120). 
 
However, a number of structural barriers still prevent many poor South Africans, and black 
women in particular from accessing the grant system (Goldblatt 2014). In particular, the 
broader administration of social assistance, in which social grants have been a core feature, 
has been fraught with challenges. This includes a lack of integration between cash transfers 
and social services, onerous grant application procedures (particularly regarding grants for 
foster-care), allegations of fraud and out-sourcing payments to private  
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corporations (Bruni 2016). Moreover, social grants are targeted and have from their inception 
tended to exclude the most vulnerable, and in particular the long-term unemployed (van der 
Berg 1997). 
 
In an effort to address the administrative barriers to accessing social grants, civil society 
organisations initiated strategic litigation as their principle, law-based advocacy strategy 
between 2010 and 2017. However, the benefits of strategic litigation alone are deserving of 
critique. The courts have concluded that many problems faced by the social grants system 
relate to the administration of payments by South African and multinational corporations. But 
is this the complete story? And to what extent can litigation alone address the country’s 
broader structural inequalities? 
 
An analytical lens of legal mobilisation can explain both the strategic potential and 
limitations of litigation alone to secure progressive structural change by way of legal 
transformation, including access to social grants as part and parcel of an internationally-
recognised human right to social security. The multi-dimensional legal mobilisation lens that 
we apply in this paper reveals the extent to which the courts are able to deliver socio-
economic justice as well as the nuanced manner in which inequalities are perpetuated and 
reinforced. 
 
Accordingly, we argue that while the courts in South Africa were able to exercise some 
judicial oversight when the state – especially members of the executive – failed to adequately 
promote or protect socio-economic rights, the courts have been unable to tackle broader 
structural exclusion and inequalities of race, gender and class. This reveals limits to the 
potential of litigation as a tool for transformative, socio-economic reform. 
 
In the first part of this article, we will provide a brief introduction to the case study of 
litigation around access to social grants in South Africa. The legal mobilisation lens will then 
be introduced, followed by an application of this lens to the case study of litigation brought 
by the Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) Black Sash in 2013, together with the Legal 
Resources Centre (LRC), a legal services NGO and others. We explain how litigation and 
other forms of law-based advocacy have increased public awareness on socio-economic 
rights issues, and compelled government to improve its administrative procedures. Second, 
we argue that while bringing matters to the courts has been symbolically useful, the results on 
the ground have been limited. We then explain how government officials have seldom been 
held individually accountable for maladministration. We conclude that civic-based, legal 
advocacy aimed at securing social assistance, and at challenging the manner in which it has 
been administered, has the potential to be reconfigured and broadened in order to more 
meaningfully advance socioeconomic justice for South Africa’s poor.  
 
2.  Litigating the Right to Social Assistance 
 
Efforts by South African NGOs to access social assistance through the Courts initially took a 
very indirect route. Following a successful bid by a private company, Cash Paymaster 
Services (CPS) to distribute social grants following a government-tender process, a 
competing company – All-Pay – took legal action to challenge this, alleging serious 
improprieties in the government-tendering process. Having lost the bidding process to CPS; 
AllPay’s primary purpose was to claim remedial damages for corporate losses. The case went 
all the way to the Constitutional Court. 
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In an unexpected turn of events, the Constitutional Court admitted two NGOs to the 
litigation, namely Corruption Watch and the Centre for Child Law as so-called amicus curiae 
or friends of the Court. From an evidentiary standpoint, Corruption Watch was able to 
demonstrate that deviations from fair procedural requirements by public officials were 
symptomatic of corruption; the corporate litigants remained silent on this matter. Meanwhile, 
the Centre for Child Law highlighted the need to protect child grant beneficiaries, building a 
stronger case for Court oversight over the administration of social grant payments (AllPay 
2013; Corruption Watch 2013). 
 
In 2013 and 2014, following legal interventions by Black Sash and the LRC in the All-Pay 
litigation, the Constitutional Court came back with a judgement that at first sight appeared to 
be favourable to these NGOs. The tender process initiated by the South African Social 
Security Agency (SASSA) in 2012 to administer the payments of social grants nationally 
through CPS for a period of five years was declared by the Court to be invalid and set aside. 
When the CPS contract was due to end on 30 September 2018, SASSA, together with the 
South African Postal Service, was eventually designated to take over the distribution of 
payments (VvG 2018).  
 
An earlier court had already concluded that the SASSA was obliged to re-initiate the tender 
process and ensure, moreover, that the government should have adequate capacity to 
ultimately take over the payment process itself. Noting that the government would not meet 
the April 2017 deadline, the court then gave the government an additional year to put 
together the arrangements. Later, when it became clear that there had been little progress, the 
Constitutional Court publicly reprimanded the Minister of Social Development, Bathabile 
Dlamini, for inadequate planning (Black Sash 2018c). This led to calls for Dlamini’s 
dismissal, although the Government instead redeployed her to another Ministerial function 
within the Office of the Presidency (Marrian 2017; Davis 2018).  
 
For some time following the litigation originally initiated by All-Pay, civil society 
organisations in South Africa, and in particular Black Sash and Corruption Watch, 
continually voiced their concern that the future of the social grant payment system was 
unclear, compromising the State’s obligation to realise the right to social security through a 
properly administered system of social grants (GroundUp 2017). In March 2018, SASSA 
requested yet another extension from the Constitutional Court to the CPS contract (Chabalala 
2018). This extension too was challenged by the NGOs. 
 
The decision to intervene in what was essentially a corporate dispute between All-Pay, the 
government and CPS, rather than to initiate separate litigation itself to address the deeper 
problems with the social assistance system was a curious decision by the NGOs. This case 
nevertheless provided a unique opportunity to both recognise the legal standing of NGOs, 
and to clarify the broader circumstances under which social grants were administered that 
were highly-unlikely to have been raised by All-Pay. Accordingly, we analyse these strategic 
litigation efforts using an analytical lens of legal mobilisation. 
 
3.  A legal mobilisation lens 
 
An analytical lens of legal mobilisation can explain how the functional (socio-legal) 
dimensions of interacting with the law as part of a social justice claim can be productively 
combined with a legal-philosophical approach based on legal pragmatism. In this regard, we 
share Taekema’s perspective that ‘does not reduce law to an instrument to advance   
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social goals (but) sees law as both a means and an end in itself’. Accordingly, law is both a 
theory and ‘a practice which is characterised by a commitment to certain specifically legal 
ideals’ (Taekema 2006: 35). As with any law-based social justice claim, there is an inter-
relationship, though often a large gap as well, between the aspirations of law and its 
implementation, which requires some form of intervention.  
 
This section builds on research by Handmaker (2019), developing legal mobilisation both as 
an analytical concept, namely the legitimate use of law to underpin political claims, and as an 
analytical lens to evaluate law-based advocacy, including but not limited to strategic interest 
litigation. 
 
3.1  Conceptualising legal mobilisation as a legitimate political claim 
 
Legal mobilisation involves the strategic use of law by civic actors to advance human rights 
as both a legitimate legal claim as well as a political claim. Legal mobilisation, including the 
pursuit of human rights and justice through the courts, is never a straightforward activity; it is 
regarded, more often by social scientists, and even by some lawyers, as a highly political act 
(Abel 1995; Gready 2004; de Feyter et al. 2011). As Abel’s 1995 study of anti-apartheid legal 
struggles in South Africa has vividly illustrated, law is a form of politics by other means. 
Accordingly, law can be effectively wielded as a shield, for example in order to protect 
individuals from abuse by the state, or as a sword, by oppressive regimes against perceived 
enemies of the state. Law may also be wielded as a sword by civic actors in the form of 
proactive claims to seek redress for injustice and/or inequalities. 
 
Legal mobilisation as a practice involves direct or indirect challenges to a state or its agents 
who are alleged to be responsible for human rights violations, involving multi-layered 
interactions between the alleged victims and perpetrators of these violations. However, 
understanding legal mobilisation as a legitimate means of claiming rights on its own doesn’t 
go far enough to explain the potential or challenges of formulating law-based advocacy. 
 
To focus on the structural factors that confront human rights advocates, and study the 
interplay between civic actors engaged in legal mobilisation, and the state institutions, or its 
agents, against whom the mobilisation is aimed, we present three theory-based propositions, 
as illustrated in Figure 1. The first proposition is that civic actors have legally-mandated 
capacity to challenge the state, which enhances their legitimacy to mobilise (international) 
law, derived from normative developments in human rights. While the legal capacity of civic 
actors to bring claims is largely uncontested – although the space for bringing these claims is 
arguably shrinking – the political legitimacy that this legality 
 
 
 
Figure 1: LM Analytical framework 
  
Legal Mobilisation is a 
Legitimate Political Claim
Capacity Translation Structural Bias
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confers is crucial in order to counter claims that advocates are abusing legal process. The 
second proposition is that civic actors engaged in legal mobilisation translate global rules into 
a locally relevant context (i.e. more than merely taking legal measures). The third proposition 
is that international law’s inherent structural bias truly matters in explaining the strategic 
potential for law-based advocacy, both in terms of the institutions against which legal 
mobilisation is directed as well as the substantive law that forms the basis of legal claims.  
 
3.2  Civic actors have the capacity to challenge the state 
 
The legal capacity of civic actors to promote and, in limited circumstances, impose state 
accountability for meeting national and international legal obligations through legal 
mobilisation has been shaped by structural changes in international normative frameworks 
and by associated political developments. 
 
This capacity of civic actors has emerged in what Ignatieff has termed a global human rights 
revolution, with juridical, advocacy and enforcement dimensions, though of a distinctly 
liberal nature (Ignatieff 1999; Ignatieff and Gutmann 2001). The liberal character of this 
‘revolution’ is problematic for three reasons that can be attributed to the ideological bias 
embedded in liberal systems of governance. First, there has been a gradual retreat of the state 
from actively fulfilling its human rights violations, leaving the primary responsibility for 
enforcing rights claims to individuals (Handmaker and Arts 2018: 4, 7). Second, liberal 
governance systems are inherently reluctant to hold business accountable in what has been 
characterised as the ‘post-regulatory state’ (Scott 2004: 145). Finally, Mutua (2013) 
addressing social justice problems in a liberal system of governance has produced both a 
human rights movement and corpus that contain a range of attendant, but largely 
unacknowledged biases, most notably a Eurocentric orientation. In South Africa especially, 
all three problems are highly visible, leading Modiri (2018: 295) in his contribution to a 
Special Issue on this topic to argue that the liberal constitutional tradition is itself very much 
‘an object of critical interrogation’. 
 
These liberal biases notwithstanding, developments in the human rights field have broken 
new ground for social-justice advocates, extending the normative scope of human rights law 
to address a wide range of social justice issues (Donnelly 2003; Higgins 1994). Such 
normative developments have been matched by a corresponding increase in civic 
participation, and expanded use of accountability mechanisms in human rights advocacy 
(Risse et. al. 1999; Korey 1998). Civic actors are, consequently, active participants in 
international and national legal processes, and who have skilfully combined litigation with 
other forms of civic mobilisation, including interactions with the media, traditional sources of 
authority and global solidarity networks. 
 
Civic participation in legal process, and particularly the ability of civic actors to invoke 
national and international law and institutions, has profoundly shifted the civic-state 
relationship, though by no means replaced it. The liberal democratic state and its institutions 
remain significant, not least when one is navigating the possibilities of translating human 
rights for social justice claims, where power relations are very often obscured by the close, 
though often nebulous relationship between government and business (Nattrass & Seekings 
2010). 
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3.3  Civic actors can be translators 
 
Drawing on their legal capacity to challenge the state, civic actors that are engaged in legal 
mobilisation fulfil a crucial mediating role in the translation of international legal norms into 
local contexts. Translation is more than merely transplanting the content of a global legal role 
into a national legal system; it requires engagement with the local-cultural context where 
either human rights obligations are not being fulfilled, or where a remedy to make a rights-
based claim is sought. While translation can happen without the intervention of translators, 
those actively seeking to accomplish translation possess what Merry conceptualises as a 
double consciousness of the content of international law and the circumstances in which it is 
framed and enforced at the international level, as well as the grounded local cultural context 
in which these international norms find expression (Merry 2006; Goodale and Merry 2007). 
By the same token, it does not mean that those who are unfamiliar with international law and 
institutions are not in a position to bring a claim against the government, but they may frame 
their claim differently. 
 
Legal consciousness is a socio-legal concept, something that can be measured. It is more than 
merely an aptitude, competence or awareness of the law, but also relates to perceptions and 
images associated with the law and legal enforcement (Hertogh 2004: 461). As Ewick and 
Silbey (1998) have argued, this includes a instrumentalist/pragmatic view of the law, 
regarding it as a game. 
 
It is important to explore people’s imagination and expectations of the law as against the 
views of professional lawyers who tend to ‘ignore’ this. (Hertogh 2004: 459). This entails 
two analytical approaches. The first approach asks: how do people experience official law or 
what is referred to by various authors as law in action. Such an approach can reveal a 
‘persistent contradiction’ between the ideal (values) behind law and the actual (values) 
embedded in a particular action (Ibid: 475; Merry 1990; Ewick and Silbey 1998; Nielsen 
2004). The second approach asks what do people experience as law or what is commonly 
referred to as the ‘living law’, focussing more on the people and their own norms, studying 
the problem and how international law is invoked to address it from below (Hertogh 2004: 
475; Ehrlich 1936; Rajagopal 2003). This approach can reveal a ‘personalistic value 
orientation’ that places a ‘strong emphasis on the special circumstances of each individual 
citizen’, whereby legitimacy is based not on official, state-published legal definitions, but on 
the extent to which public officials feel a close affinity for the local community (Ibid: 477-
478). Drawing on these approaches, legal translation focuses on the social processes of giving 
effect to human rights obligations (Merry 2006: 39). This may, or may not include an explicit 
engagement with the structural bias contained in international law. 
 
3.4  Structural bias of international law 
 
Beyond framing social justice claims in terms of human rights, legal mobilisers may engage 
in a more complex engagement with the structural bias contained in both substantive law and 
institutional structures, which heavily condition civic efforts to hold states accountable to 
international human rights norms and tends to favour elite interests. Law reflects particular 
values (certainty, predictability, universality), and is accompanied by regulatory institutions 
that are in many cases relics of earlier regimes in which most of the world was colonised. 
Accordingly, the third component of a legal mobilisation  
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framework applies Koskenniemi’s (2009: 9) concept of structural bias in global governance, 
referring to ‘the way in which patterns of fixed preference are formed and operate inside 
international institutions’.  
 
Koskenniemi (Ibid: 9-12) argues that structural bias is a consequence of international law’s 
fragmentation, meaning that international law has evolved into ‘a wide variety of specialist 
vocabularies and institutions’. This includes humanitarian law and human rights, which are 
some of the more recent, and contested of these vocabularies. On the one hand, it is possible 
to mobilise these vocabularies, adding legal legitimacy to a claim by framing it in the 
language of these international legal vocabularies (Handmaker and Arts 2018: 16). On the 
other hand, the rhetoric of rights is said to have lost its ‘transformative effect’ through over-
legalistic explanations and is ‘not as powerful as it claims to be’ (Koskenniemi 2011: 133). 
 
The structural bias of law is also prevalent at the national level, which Galanter (1974) has 
observed tends to predictably favour elite sections of society, categorised as repeat players 
who make frequent use of the legal system (and particularly litigation) in order to shape the 
law and secure their interests. Like corporate entities, NGOs are also often linked to these 
elite sections of society, both as sources of financing and through other, social networks 
(Mutua 2001). 
 
Alongside political legitimacy, this three-dimensional lens forms an analytical basis for 
assessing the potential of legal mobilisation to lead to social transformation. Returning to our 
main argument, we now apply this lens to the struggle for social assistance in South Africa. 
  
4.  Analysing the struggle for social grants in South Africa through legal mobilisation 
 
As noted earlier, NGOs joined a corporate dispute over the outcome of a government tender 
in order to raise attention to and trigger a broader debate regarding the distribution of social 
grants in South Africa. While bringing the matter to the courts raised public awareness 
through the media on socio-economic rights issues, members of the government were never 
held personally accountable for maladministration, including their role in questionable tender 
processes and wasteful resource expenditure by their political superiors. This is in spite of 
repeated court pronouncements on the personal conduct of the Minister in stalling planning 
processes. Consequently, citizens affected by failings associated with social grants have 
questioned the effectiveness of South Africa’s constitutional framework and the rule of law 
(Pityana 2017).  
 
Beyond individual accountability for government mis-management, the litigation also drew 
renewed attention to the questionable role of private companies becoming involved in key 
government functions to the point of state ‘capture’. In this case, CPS and its holding 
company (Net1) were found to have violated the legal right to privacy of grant beneficiaries 
through distributing its data for the purposes of marketing largely financial goods and 
services of third-party contractors (Black Sash 2018c).  
 
However pertinent such matters are to the failings of social grants as part of a broader social 
assistance system, there were deeper, structural issues at stake that Black Sash and other 
NGOs wished to address through strategic litigation. The extent to which litigation 
successfully addressed these deeper issues can be analysed through our legal mobilisation 
lens. 
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4.1  Securing social assistance as a legitimate political claim 
 
South Africa has a rich history of claiming constitutionally protected socio-economic rights 
for historically marginalised groups through the courts. Civic actors have, since the 1980s, 
persistently sought redress for historical injustices framed by persistent inequalities of gender 
and race (Abel 1995). Originally forged during the anti-apartheid struggle, the legally-
supported political claims brought from the late 1990s mirror these earlier litigation 
strategies. They have been brought forward by South African NGOs, social movements and 
others in the post-1994 period of liberal democracy in South Africa and have often been 
framed in terms of a broader critique of globalisation. They have been regarded as a 
legitimate ‘counterbalance’ to try and promote the concerns of the poor and elevate these 
concerns to the political agenda (Ballard et. al. 2005). 
 
The courts have been slow to regard inequality as impeding access to constitutionally 
guaranteed civil, political and socio-economic rights. Moreover, the intersectional 
implications of vertical inequality, represented by wealth and income, with other forms of 
horizontal inequality, such as the power dynamics that arise from one’s gender, race or class, 
have been largely unaddressed by the courts, and associated institutional reform has also been 
limited. Beyond expanding the content of socio-economic rights, the courts have been 
hesitant to prescribe how the legislature and executive ought to go about realising 
constitutional obligations and have refused to recognise a minimum core of obligations. For 
example, in the case of Mazibuko (2009), the Constitutional Court debated, but ultimately 
rejected the notion of a minimum core of essential rights as prescribed by international 
human rights treaty bodies (Bilchitz 2003; Young 2008). The minimum core approach has 
been criticised for being inflexible, placing undue pressure on the State to meet the diverse 
needs of people who are poor (Wesson 2004). Instead, the Courts have negotiated a ‘delicate 
balance’ (Klaaren 2006) between court-sanctioned interventions and government decision-
making through a cautious interpretation of ‘reasonableness’ (Hoexter 2006). 
 
These limitations notwithstanding, socio-economic rights litigation has allowed civic actors 
to assert some political claims, seeking to shape the trajectory of the South African political 
economy. Although centred on human rights violations, this litigation has also highlighted 
maladministration as perpetuating and reinforcing structural discrimination that is 
experienced daily by historically marginalised groups. In 2011, the year in which the tender 
process for social grant administration commenced, then President Zuma claimed that the 
government could not afford to indefinitely provide social grants as a welfare state, but 
should rather focus on developing equal opportunities and reduce the number of grant 
beneficiaries. He added that the state could not continue paying for the failures of the 
apartheid administration, and that taxpayers should develop the country ‘rather than feed the 
poor’ (City Press 2011).  
 
While civil society organisations have attempted to dispel the myth that social grants 
entrench laziness and dependency on the state by its beneficiaries, the legitimacy of their law-
based political claim has been enhanced by framing it as a constitutional right of beneficiaries 
(Ferreira 2017). Furthermore, the process of reviewing the government’s actions through the 
courts exposed an intricate relationship between the state and the private sector, as well as the 
covert ways in which the private sector has continued to profit from the structural exclusion 
and social inequalities experienced by historically marginalised groups (Du Toit 2017).  
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Beyond reinforcing the legitimacy of the claim to secure social assistance, we apply our legal 
mobilisation lens to take a deeper look at how the specific cases that were brought in relation 
to social grants strengthened the potential for social transformation. The first element of this 
is the capacity that civic actors had to bring a claim to social assistance in the first place. 
 
4.2  Asserting the capacity to litigate access to social grants  
 
The capacity of individuals and groups to bring a socio-economic rights claim, or the so-
called ‘justiciability’ of these rights, including the right to social security through social 
assistance, has been contested since the country’s constitutional negotiations of the early 
1990s. The court’s handling of socio-economic cases too has been mixed. Strategic litigation 
on socio-economic rights initiated by civil society organisations has revealed both the 
inseparable relationship between civil and political and socio-economic rights and the 
nuanced manner in which structural inequality manifests and is reinforced. Strategic litigation 
has also affirmed how important it is to involve broader social groups to realise the potential 
of socio-economic rights, including conceptualising structural change as an indicator for how 
such rights can be progressively realised (Langford et. al. 2014). 
 
The very first case brought before the Constitutional Court with respect to the administration 
of the social grants system revealed a low threshold of capacity and – as mentioned – was not 
initially brought by NGOs (AllPay 2013). The case was indeed not originally concerned with 
the right as such to social security, but with maladministration within the grant system, 
particularly after state responsibilities had been outsourced to private companies. By 
admitting the NGOs to the litigation, the Court crucially recognised both the legal capacity of 
the NGOs and the human rights implications of corporate actions.  
 
Recognition of legal capacity was further extended in subsequent litigation, through 
grassroots mobilisation involving not only Black Sash, the Centre for Child Law and the 
Legal Resources Centre, but also the Centre for Applied Legal Studies (CALS), an action-
research Institute based at Wits University. Together, these NGOs exposed the extent to 
which Net1, CPS’ holding company, continued to benefit from wilful maladministration.  
 
Beyond analysing how legal capacity had been exercised, we now analyse the extent to which 
NGOs litigating access to social grants have served as legal translators of human rights.  
 
4.3  Black Sash as translators 
 
As an approach, legal translation can reveal how South African NGOs mediate their 
relationship between internationally-prescribed human rights to social security and the 
locally-relevant circumstances in which access to social grants is an imperative. Like other 
NGOs with a nationwide network of advice offices, Black Sash had decades of human rights 
and social justice activism and grassroots knowledge of social justice issues that informed its 
national and international advocacy. The organisation also had extensive experience in 
advocating for the advancement of human rights through the United Nations, as well as the 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights. Accordingly, as a longstanding, locally-
grounded, internationally-engaged advocate,  
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Black Sash has played an important role both in the anti-apartheid movement and in 
addressing racism and inequality generally.  
 
From the late 1990s, Black Sash focussed its advocacy on social grants and social protection, 
poverty reduction and inequality, through citizen-based monitoring of human rights 
violations, human rights education and training. The organisation has made frequent 
reference to international law and the circumstances in which it is framed and enforced, as 
well as displaying a grounded understanding of the relevant local and national context in 
which international human rights find expression. According to Merry’s (2006) 
conceptualisation of a double consciousness, the organisation was well-situated to operate as 
a legal translator and to frame a nuanced response to rights realisation. 
 
This was vividly illustrated in 2011 when, based on reports from its advice offices, the 
organisation was alerted to electronic debit deductions from social grant beneficiaries’ bank 
accounts. Black Sash had earlier met with representatives of SASSA to discuss the 
unauthorised deductions, expressing concern that the tender agreement with the identified 
service provider (CPS) allowed for the advancement of for-profit micro-loans to grant 
beneficiaries. Through its Hands Off Our Grants (HOOG) campaign launched in 2012 and 
implemented though community advice offices throughout South Africa, Black Sash (2018a), 
grant beneficiaries were advised by Black Sash regarding lawful and unlawful deductions 
from their social grants accounts. A core component of the campaign was to gather evidence 
not only of debit deductions from SASSA beneficiaries for items that were deemed as 
‘luxury’ items, but also for many loans made by micro-lenders affiliated to Net1 and CPS for 
essential items that were unauthorised and unlawful, using social grants as collateral. In 2013, 
the Black Sash and its legal representatives again met with SASSA, wherein SASSA 
committed to addressing these concerns and to attend to the relevant loopholes in the tender 
agreement with Net1. Black Sash also engaged with the Reserve Bank of South Africa and 
the Department of Social Development (DSD) requesting intervention to prevent subsequent 
deductions, resulting in the establishment of a Ministerial Task Team to explore ways to stop 
the deductions (Black Sash 2018b). Black Sash’s data from its advice offices exposed these 
practices that trapped South Africa’s most vulnerable communities into a cycle of poverty 
and debt. 
 
After Black Sash and other NGOs established that micro-lenders were not selling loans for 
luxury items, but rather for essential services, the Constitutional Court ordered the State to 
ensure that personal data of grant beneficiaries be sufficiently safeguarded, and not be used 
for any purpose other than the payment of social grants (Black Sash 2018c). Framing the 
relevance of their claim in terms of international human rights, it was argued in court that: 
 
Article 9 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
provides that ‘The States Parties to the present Covenant recognise the right of 
everyone to social security, including social insurance.’ In the implementation of its 
obligations … South Africa is obliged to use ‘all appropriate means, including 
particularly the adoption of legislative measures’ in taking whatever steps are 
necessary to ensure that everyone enjoys the right to social security. As a matter of 
logic, enjoyment of the right requires protection against the depletion of the social 
assistance which is provided (Black Sash 2017a). 
 
Reference was also made to General Comment 19, which ‘requires that State parties prevent 
third parties from interfering in any way with the enjoyment of the right to 
FINAL AUTHOR VERSION – Note: Please check against the published version (including page numbers) in 
Development Southern Africa. First available online on 4 Oct 2019 and likely to form part of Volume 36(6). 
 11 
social security’ (United Nations 2008: para 66). NGOs argued that the obligation to realise 
the rights contained in article 9 also extended to protecting citizens from ‘unreasonable 
interference’ and other matters. Accordingly, they argued, the government had ‘a positive 
obligation to put in place an adequate legislative and regulatory framework to protect the 
depletion of social grants’ (Ibid: para 44). 
 
From a legal consciousness standpoint, Black Sash framed their complaint by emphasising 
‘the special circumstances of each individual citizen’, whereby the claim was based not on 
official, state-published legal definitions, but on the extent to which public officials lacked an 
affinity for the social security needs of South African citizens (Hertogh 2004:477-478). The 
argument put forward to the Court of Appeal emphasised how out of touch public officials 
were with the needs and concerns of South African citizens, revealing a ‘persistent 
contradiction’ between the rules and values that underpinned proper government behaviour, 
and the actual values embedded in the actions of Net1 (Ibid: 475). 
 
Frequent, and contextually-grounded references by NGOs to international law and to the 
nuanced circumstances of SASSA and Net 1’s actions in Court documents, in public 
statements and in awareness campaigns revealed NGOs’ roles as legal translators. However, 
given the volatile politics surrounding the claim, stronger action was arguably needed. This 
compels us to examine the extent to which full use has been made of international law’s 
structural bias to leverage additional external pressure on the government to meet its 
international obligations. 
 
4.4  Leveraging the structural bias regarding access to social assistance 
 
While some reference was made to international human rights, references to international law 
by NGOs in litigating access to social assistance through targeted grants has been fairly 
limited. The fact that Black Sash, with its long experience advocating at international 
organisations, did not make broader use of international law, was surprising. As noted earlier, 
patterns of fixed preference are formed and operate inside international institutions, and 
create structural preferences (Koskenniemi 2009: 9). This includes international human rights 
treaty bodies as well as other inter-governmental bodies such as the World Bank and 
regulatory institutions such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), which operates a 
dispute settlement body to address compliance with a wide range of international trade 
agreements and can serve as a partial restraint to liberalising social insurance measures 
(Busch and Reinhardt 2000: 167). In other words, both the World Bank and the WTO were 
key international agencies to focus on in advocating for social assistance. 
 
Indeed, one exception to the lack of international law advocacy was in November 2017, when 
the Black Sash and Corruption Watch filed a separate complaint with the Ombudsman of the 
International Financial Corporation (IFC), which forms part of the World Bank group. This 
regarded an investment of USD 107 million made by the IFC in CPS and its American-
owned holding company, Net1. The NGOs contended that IFC’s investment was in breach of 
the IFC’s own policy on environmental and sustainable development and requested a 
compliance appraisal and investigation (Black Sash et. al. 2017; Black Sash 2017b).  
 
However, broader reference could have been made to other international human rights 
regimes and Social Protection Floors (ILO 2012). For example, the lack of broader access to 
social security has had a particularly devastating impact on children and women  
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(Goldblatt 2014). Hence, from the standpoint of equality, the concluding observations of 
human rights Treaty Body mechanisms, including, but not limited to the Committee on the 
Rights of Children (CRC) and Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against 
Women (CEDAW) could have strengthened the NGOs claim and leveraged additional, 
external pressures, for example in a subsequent review process provided for in accordance 
with an international treaty.  
 
Furthermore, claims could have been enriched by reference to the Sustainable Development 
Goals that were formulated in 2015 and administered by various United Nations agencies. 
Specifically, reference could have been made to the ‘multi-stakeholder Social Protection 
Systems and Floors Partnerships for SDG 1.3’, which through international alliances enables 
aims to ‘implement nationally appropriate social protection systems’. These are based on 
recommendations by the International Labour Organization and furthermore ‘grounded in 
international human rights instruments’ (United Nations 2018).  
 
In short, appealing to either the ILO, to the WTO and to human rights treaty bodies could 
have broadened the scope of the claim. This would have allowed Black Sash to leverage 
South Africa’s numerous, negotiated fixed preferences embedded in these international 
organisations to address deeper, globalised, structural inequalities that were responsible for 
increasing poverty in the country and had made social assistance such a crucial safety net for 
a growing number of South Africans. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
In this paper, we applied a legal mobilisation lens to a specific study of strategic litigation by 
NGOs to secure access to social assistance, arguing the relevance of legitimacy and capacity 
as well as the important roles that NGOs can play as translators of the global right to social 
security in locally-relevant contexts. We have also highlighted the potentially significant 
added-value of leveraging the structural bias of international institutions to strengthen 
national claims, and in particular how external pressures could be mobilised from various 
human rights treaty bodies, the International Labour Organization and other United Nations 
agencies. 
 
From a legitimacy standpoint, highlighting state maladministration during tender 
procurement processes through the courts has been an important factor in not only exercising 
some level of judicial oversight over the state, but also raising public awareness of the 
financial and human costs of corruption committed by public officials at the highest level, 
and raising questions about the DSD’s legitimacy, and the government as a whole, in 
promoting socio-economic rights and addressing economic inequality. Moreover, the cases 
brought by NGOs on administration of the social grant system have gone beyond the 
departmental level. Further, the campaigns underpinning legal mobilisation on access to 
social assistance have strengthened public support for the removal of President Zuma and led 
to the redeployment of members of the executive in portfolios tasked with protecting the 
most marginalised.  
 
Because of the significant media attention that high-profile litigation receives, the courts have 
become an important site of democratic contestation, where citizens are able to express their 
dissatisfaction with the executive and significantly influence political outcomes without 
relying on election cycles alone. The lower courts in particular have demonstrated their 
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independence in holding the executive accountable and have become a means through which 
citizens sustain their commitment to a liberal democratic governance project. 
 
Through exposing the wilful nature of maladministration by the executive, socio-economic 
rights litigation has advanced a core, liberal democratic goal of promoting equality before the 
law. Legal mobilisation strategies have moreover highlighted a corrupt relationship between 
members of the executive, and between the state and the private sector. However, individual 
responsibility is lacking; while Bathabile Dlamini was ordered by the Constitutional Court to 
provide testimony as to why she should not be held personally liable for maladministration 
and poor planning, she remained for some time afterwards a Minister in the government of 
Ramaphosa. 
 
There remain at least three, specific and inter-related observations, deserving of further 
research, of how court-based, strategic litigation of social security claims on its own has 
inherent limitations in delivering socio-economic justice and denting the massive political, 
economic and social inequalities in South Africa. First, the procedural character of socio-
economic rights claims through the courts has limited the courts’ ability to progressively 
realise these rights, containing the broader debate on social security to the realisation of 
access to social grants. Moreover, by failing to make more elaborate reference to 
international legal avenues, litigation strategies have been unable to transcend conventional 
legal argumentation. Second, while socio-economic rights litigation claims have highlighted 
administrative failures and wasteful expenditure of the post-apartheid liberal democratic 
administration, the extent to which the courts are willing to hold the executive accountable is 
heavily circumscribed. Finally, it remains troublesome to ensure the State’s compliance with 
court orders, which should at the very least be subject to further monitoring. Post-litigation 
monitoring has, indeed, been a persistent challenge in South Africa (Cote and van Garderen 
2011: 181; Brickhill 2018). This is especially complicated in the current instance since 
transition of grants administration from CPS to SASSA and SAPO was concluded in 2018 
and thus falls outside the frame of the litigation. 
 
Ultimately, the power of law-based advocacy is neither confined to litigation alone, nor is the 
Constitution only about claiming rights through the courts. Indeed, the interference of the 
courts in matters that fall outside of their expertise can risk creating perceptions of 
incompetence and illegitimacy (Dixon and Suk 2018). In all matters of social and economic 
justice, including broader access to social assistance, legal mobilisation is about placing 
dignity and equality at the centre of all policy-making. Further, reducing inequality requires 
deeper structural reform of the political economy and an enhanced expertise on the part of 
policy-makers. Hence, inequality of access to social assistance can still be addressed by way 
of legal mobilisation, albeit as part of a comprehensive strategy combining litigation with 
public awareness and targeted campaigning of the legislature and the executive. 
 
Acknowledgements 
The authors are grateful for feedback received by Dr. Meryl du Plessis of the University of 
the Witwatersrand. The authors also express appreciation to the anonymous referees for their 
feedback on earlier drafts. 
 
  
FINAL AUTHOR VERSION – Note: Please check against the published version (including page numbers) in 
Development Southern Africa. First available online on 4 Oct 2019 and likely to form part of Volume 36(6). 
 14 
References 
 
Abel, R, 1995. Politics by other means: Law in the struggle against apartheid, 1980-1994. New York, 
Routledge. 
AllPay, 2013. AllPay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd & Others v Chief Executive 
Officer of the South African Social Security Agency & Others [2013] CCT 48/13 (Nos. 1 and 2). 
Ballard, R, Habib, A, Valodia, I and Zuern, E, 2005. Globalization, marginalization and contemporary 
social movements in South Africa. African Affairs, 104, 615-634. 
van der Berg, S, 1997. South African social security under apartheid and beyond, Development 
Southern Africa, 14, 481-503. 
Bilchitz, D, 2003. Towards a reasonable approach to the minimum core: Laying the foundations for 
future socio-economic rights jurisprudence. South African Journal on Human Rights, 19(1), 1-26. 
Black Sash, 2018a. Hands off our grants -what have we done to assist?, Available at: 
https://www.blacksash.org.za/index.php/media-and-publications/media-statements/10-
campaigns/hands-off-our-grants/390-hands-off-our-grants-what-have-we-done-to-assist  
Black Sash, 2018b. Timeline of Events in #HandsOffOurGrant Campaign, available at 
https://www.blacksash.org.za/index.php/timeline-of-events. 
Black Sash, 2018c. Trust & Another v Minister of Social Development & Others CCT 48/17 (order 
dated 23 March 2018). 
Black Sash, 2017a. Heads of argument for the appellants’ applicant for leave to appeal, Supreme 
Court of Appeal, Case no. 752/2017, at para. 39. 
Black Sash, 2017b. Media statement: South African NGOs question IFC’s investment into Net1’, 
available at https://www.blacksash.org.za/index.php/media-and-publications/media-statements/81-
south-african-ngos-question-ifc-s-investment-into-net1 
Black Sash, Corruption Watch, Equal Education (2017) Complaint: IFC $107 million investment in 
Net1 UEPS technologies Inc., available at https://www.blacksash.org.za/index.php/media-and-
publications/media-statements/81-south-african-ngos-question-ifc-s-investment-into-net1 
Brickhill, J (Ed.), 2018. Public interest litigation in South Africa. Johannesburg: Juta. 
Bruni, L, 2016. Reforming the social assistance system, in Alam, A et al (eds) Making it happen – 
selected case studies of institutional reform in South Africa. Washington D.C.: World Bank Group, 
119 – 133. 
Busch, M, and Reinhardt, E, 2000. Bargaining in the shadow of the law: Early settlement in 
GATT/WTO disputes, Fordham International Law Journal, 24, 158-172. 
Chabalala, J, 2018. There will be chaos if the CPS contract is not extended, court hears. News24, 
available at https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/sassa-there-will-be-chaos-if-cps-contract-
is-not-extended-court-hears-20180306. 
City Press, 2011. Social grants can’t be sustained: Zuma. News24, 24 November 2011, available at 
https://www.news24.com/Archives/City-Press/Social-grants-cant-be-sustained-Zuma-20150430. 
Corruption Watch, 2013. CW in successful R10 billion tender appeal. 2 December 2013, available at 
http://www.corruptionwatch.org.za/cw-in-successful-r10-billion-tender-appeal/. 
Cote, D and van Garderen, J, 2011. Challenges to public interest litigation in South Africa: External 
and Internal challenges to determining the public interest South African Journal on Human Rights, 
27(1), 167-182. 
Davis, R, 2018. Cabinet reshuffle: Bathabile Dlamini’s appointment disrespects ALL South African 
women, Daily Maverick, available at https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2018-02-27-cabinet-
reshuffle-bathabile-dlaminis-appointment-disrespects-all-south-african-women/#.WzFsCxJKiCQ 
De Feyter, K, Parmentier, S and Timmerman, C (Eds.), 2011. The local relevance of human rights. 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
Dixon, R and Suk, J, 2018. Liberal constitutionalism and economic inequality. The University of 
Chicago Law Review, 85, 369-401. 
Donnelly, J, 2003, Universal human rights in theory and practice, Ithaca, Cornell University Press. 
  
FINAL AUTHOR VERSION – Note: Please check against the published version (including page numbers) in 
Development Southern Africa. First available online on 4 Oct 2019 and likely to form part of Volume 36(6). 
 15 
 
Du Toit, A, 2017. The real risks behind SA’s social grant payment crisis. Corruption Watch, 21 
February 2017, available at http://www.corruptionwatch.org.za/real-risks-behind-sas-social-grant-
payment-crisis/. 
Ehrlich, E, 1936, Fundamental Principles of the Sociology of Law, Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press. 
Ewick, P and Silbey, S, 1998. The common place of law. Chicago, University of Chicago Press. 
Ferreira, L, 2017. Factsheet: Social grants in South Africa- separating myth from reality. Africa 
Check, 28 February 2017, available at https://africacheck.org/factsheets/separating-myth-from-
reality-a-guide-to-social-grants-in-south-africa/. 
Galanter, M, 1974. Why the haves come out ahead: Speculations on the limits of legal change. Law 
and Society Review 4, 95-160. 
Goldblatt, B, 2014. Social security in South Africa – A gender and human rights analysis, Law and 
Politics in Africa, Asia and Latin America, 47(1), 22-42. 
Goodale, M and Merry, S, 2007. The practice of human rights: tracking law between the global and 
the local. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
Gready, P, 2004. Fighting for human rights, New York, Routledge. 
GroundUp, 2017. GroundUp: Black Sash raises red flag over future of Sassa accounts. Daily 
Maverick, 17 October 2017, available at https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2017-10-17-
groundup-black-sash-raises-red-flag-over-future-of-sassa-accounts/#.WjgC1oVOJPY. 
Handmaker, J and Arts, K, 2019. Mobilising international law as an instrument of global justice, in 
Handmaker and Arts (Eds.), Mobilising International Law for ‘Global Justice’. Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1-21. 
Handmaker, J (2019). Researching legal mobilisation and lawfare, ISS Working Paper Series, 641, 
The Hague, International Institute of Social Studies. Retrieved from 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/115129. 
Hertogh, M, 2004. A “European” conception of legal consciousness: Rediscovering Eugene Ehrlich. 
Journal of Law and Society 31(4), 457-481. 
Higgins, R, 1994, Problems and process: international law and how we use it, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press. 
Hoexter, C, 2006. Standards of review of administrative action: Review for reasonableness in 
Klaaren, J. (ed.), A delicate balance: the place of the judiciary in a constitutional democracy. Cape 
Town, SiberInk, 61-72. 
Ignatieff, M, 1999. Whose universal values? The crisis in human rights. Amsterdam, Stichting 
Praemium Erasmianum. 
Ignatieff, M and Gutmann, A, 2001. Human rights as politics and idolatry. Princeton, N.J., Princeton 
University Press. 
ILO, 2012. ILO Social Protection Minimum Floors. Recommendation 202 of 2012. Geneva, 
International Labour Organization. Available at https://www.ilo.org/secsoc/areas-of-work/legal-
advice/WCMS_205341/lang--en/index.htm 
Klaaren, J. (ed.), 2006. A delicate balance: the place of the judiciary in a constitutional democracy. 
Cape Town, SiberInk. 
Korey, W, 1998. NGOs and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: ‘a curious grapevine’. New 
York, Palgrave Macmillan. 
Koskenniemi, M, 2011. The politics of international law. Oxford, Hart. 
Koskenniemi, M, 2009. The politics of international law – 20 years later European Journal of 
International Law 20, pp. 7-19 
Langford, M, Cousins, B, Dugard, J and Madlingozi, T, (eds.), 2014. Socio-economic rights in South 
Africa: Symbols or substance?. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
Marrian, N, 2017. SACP urges ANC to fire Bathabile. Business Day, 15 March 2017, available at 
https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/national/2017-03-15-sacp-urges-anc-to-fire-bathabile-dlamini/. 
Mazibuko, 2009. Mazibuko and Others v City of Johannesburg and Others (CCT 39/09). 
Merry, S, 1990. Getting justice and getting even: Legal consciousness among working-class 
Americans. Chicago, Chicago University Press. 
FINAL AUTHOR VERSION – Note: Please check against the published version (including page numbers) in 
Development Southern Africa. First available online on 4 Oct 2019 and likely to form part of Volume 36(6). 
 16 
Merry, S, 2006. Transnational human rights and local activism: mapping the middle American 
Anthropologist 108, 38-51. 
Modiri, J, 2018. Introduction to special issue: Conquest, constitutionalism and democratic 
contestations South African Journal on Human Rights, 34, 295-299. 
Mutua, M, 2001. Human rights international NGOs: A critical evaluation in Welch, C. (ed) NGOs and 
human rights: Promise and performance, Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 151-
159. 
Mutua, M, 2013. Human rights: A political and cultural critique. Philadelphia, University of 
Pennsylvania Press. 
Bruni, L, 2016. Reforming the Social Assistance System, in Alam, A et al (eds) Making it happen – 
selected case studies of institutional reform in South Africa. World Bank Group, 119 – 133. 
Nattrass, N & Seekings, J, 2010. State, business and growth in post-apartheid South Africa. IPPG 
(Research programme consortium on improving Institutions for Pro-Poor Growth) Discussion 
Paper Series 34. Available at www.ippg.org.uk/papers/dp34a.pdf. 
Nielsen, L, 2004. Situating legal consciousness: Experiences and attitudes of ordinary citizens about 
law and street harassment. Law and Society Review 34(4), 1055-1090. 
Pityana, S, 2017. Op-ed: Can South Africa’s constitutional democracy be sustained. Daily Maverick, 
20 October 2017, available at https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2017-10-20-op-ed-can-
south-africas-constitutional-democracy-be-sustained/#.WjgC7oVOJPY. 
Rajagopal, R, 2003. International law from below: Development, social movements and third world 
resistance. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. 
Risse, T, Ropp, S and Sikkink, K, 1999. The power of human rights: international norms and 
domestic change. New York, Cambridge University Press. 
Scott, C. (2004) Regulation in the age of governance: The rise of the post-regulatory state, in Jordana, 
J and Levi-Faur, D (eds) The politics of regulation. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 145–174. 
Taekema, S, 2006. Beyond common sense: Philosophical pragmatism’s relevance to law Retfæerd: 
Nordisk Juridisk Tidsskrift 29, 22-36. 
United Nations, 2018. Social protection systems and floors partnerships for SDG 1.3, available at: 
https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/partnership/?p=16346. 
United Nations (2008) General Comment 19: The right to social security UN Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, at its 39th session, UN Doc E/C 12/GC/19. 
VvG, 2018. Anti-corruption expert interviewed by the authors on 22 August 2018. 
Wesson, M, 2004. Grootboom and beyond: Reassessing the socio- economic jurisprudence of the 
South African Constitutional Court. South African Journal on Human Rights, 20(2), 284-308. 
Young, K, 2008. The minimum core of economic and social rights: A concept in search of content. 
Yale International Law Journal, 13, 113-176. 
 
 
